Such philosophising affects a big chunk of money. In 2015 effective altruists spent $75m, almost all of it on global health and development, according to a member of the EA movement who keeps track of the numbers. By 2021 they spent more than $600m; around 20% went towards preventing long-term existential risks to humanity, such as future pandemics. This year long-termist causes, which, apart from dealing with climate change, often get little funding from other donors, have received roughly 38% of effective altruists’ money (see chart).
With more funding has come increased criticism. One common objection is that long-termism provides little clarity on just how much to prioritise needs in the distant future relative to those of the present day. Derek Parfit, a British philosopher who died in 2017, raised the question of whether future generations can hold the current one responsible for their suffering: if our generation had acted differently those people would not have been born.
Strong long-termism can also lead people to disregard common-sense moral commitments to living people. They might spend billions on artificial-intelligence safety research while ignoring homelessness today. Another criticism is that uncertainty about the future undermines the case for long-termism: how can we act sensibly when we cannot know what the consequences will be in the distant future? Perhaps it is better to focus on what we know will help people now.
Mr Bankman-Fried’s downfall will hurt the finances of long-termist causes, if not the arguments for them. His defunct “FTX Future Fund” had committed $160m to long-termist projects. Other effective altruists are questioning long-termism as part of a broader reckoning of the movement following FTX’s collapse. Even before it, some worried that effective altruists had become too focused on long-termism.